

# Comments on Hayama Proposal

Yukari TAKAMURA

Nagoya University

26 July 2011

E-mail: [takamura.yukari@g.mbox.nagoya-u.ac.jp](mailto:takamura.yukari@g.mbox.nagoya-u.ac.jp)

## Hayama Proposalの位置(1) Context of Hayama Proposal(1)

- 2010年12月のカンクン合意: 次期枠組みの形が何となく見えてきた? **Cancun Agreements** (Dec. 2010): Has a Post-2012 regime been taking shape?
  - 「工業化以前に比べて気温上昇を二度未満」という**長期目標 Long-term target** to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2 ° C above pre-industrial levels
  - **附属書I国 (先進国)** による**国別排出削減目標 Quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets by Annex I countries (developed countries)**
  - **途上国は、持続可能な発展と技術・資金などの支援を条件に、その国に適切な削減行動をとる** **Developing countries will take nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs)** in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building.
  - **京都議定書**の下で先進国が目標を設定するかを含め、最終的な合意の**法形式は合意されず** **Legal form** of a post 2012 regime and the future of **the Kyoto Protocol** therein has not yet been agreed upon.

## Hayama Proposalの位置(2)

### Context of Hayama Proposal(2)

- 「**均衡のとれた結果**」が合意の鍵 “**Balanced outcome**” is a key for the agreement
  - 合意の内容とともに、法的拘束力があるかないかが国際約束の強度に影響を与え、「均衡」に影響を与えると認識されている Countries perceive that both the substance and its legally-bindingness impact the stringency (effectiveness) of their commitment and “the balance” of the agreement.

## Hayama Proposalへのコメント(1)

### Comments on Hayama Proposal(1)

- 提案の興味深い点 Interesting points of the proposal
  - **すべての国が等しく国際的約束をするが、不遵守の場合にかされる措置に差異を設ける** All countries have a **legally binding commitment** but with **differentiation of consequences** in case of possible non-compliance.
    - **法的拘束力と約束の強度(実効性)** Being legally binding and **stringency (effectiveness)** of commitment
  - **約束遵守の複眼的評価** **Assessment of compliance** from several criteria
  - **覚書(MOU)によるレジーム外のアクター/フォーラムとの協働** **Collaboration with actors/forums outside the regime through MOU**

## Hayama Proposalへのコメント(2) Comments on Hayama Proposal(2)

- **いくつかの示唆** Some suggestions
  - 法的拘束力と約束の強度 (実効性) Being legally binding and stringency (effectiveness) of commitment
    - 不遵守の措置による差異化のほかに、**約束の質や国に与える裁量の大きさで差異化** Other type of differentiation might be possible: differentiation by **the type of the commitment/** by **the extent of discretion** given to countries.
      - 数値目標/国が自主的に選択した削減行動 Quantified target/ mitigation actions voluntarily selected by countries
      - 明確な数値目標/努力義務、応能義務など裁量の大きな約束 Clearly defined quantified target/ commitment with broader discretion or conditional commitment

## Hayama Proposalへのコメント(3) Comments on Hayama Proposal(3)

- **合意を困難としている要因**は何か What are the factors that would make the agreement difficult?
  - **要因の変化** (ex. 米国の政治事情の変化) で **合意可能なオプション、オプションの利点と課題** が異なってくる **Change in factors** such as political situation in the US might influence the **acceptability (pros and cons)** of these options.
- **時間軸を考慮したオプションの評価の必要性** Would be necessary to **assess the acceptability (pros and cons) of options with timeline.**
  - NZ提案: オプションB-1をオプションAへの移行的制度と位置づけ Proposal from NZ: Option B-1 as regime with transitional phase toward Option A
  - 包括的COP決定を移行的制度と位置づけ Comprehensive COP decision of Option C as regime with transitional phase